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FREE Law School Outlines List by Subject Constitutional Law Constitutional Law | Constitutional Law |
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School: unknown
Year: 2002
Professor: unknown
Course Outline provided by Legalnut.com
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Constitutional Law
“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.”
Three levels of review:
Appeal from conviction for violation of a state advertising statute. New York had a regulation which prohibited advertising on vehicles, but allowed advertising on business vehicles so long as the vehicles were engaged in their owner’s usual work and are not used mainly for advertising. The Equal Protection Clause does not require that a statute eradicate all evils of the same type or none at all. “One step at a time” – A statute that is under-inclusive is not necessarily invalid.
A class is considered a “suspect class” if it is usually politically powerless and frequently discriminated against.
Appeal from murder conviction. Stauder (D), a black man, was convicted of murder by a jury from which blacks were excluded. A state may not prevent blacks from serving on juries. Two themes which are significant in determining whether a group constitutes a suspect classification and whether legislation violates constitutional prohibitions: (1) whether the class is one that has historically been the victim of societal discrimination, and (2) whether the legislation in question tends to stigmatize that class in the eyes of society.
Appeal from conviction of violating a city health and safety ordinance. Only Chinese aliens were prosecuted under an ordinance requiring laundries to be constructed out of brick. A valid law, neutral on its face, unevenly and discriminatorily administered violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
Appeal from criminal prosecution for violating a state railway accommodation-segregation law. Plessy (D) was arrested for trying to sit in a railroad car which was designated “for whites only.” Segregation of the races is reasonable if based upon the established custom, usage, and traditions of the people in the state. Expressly overruled by Brown v. Board of Education
Black minors sought the Court’s aid in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a non-segregated basis. Black children were denied admission to public schools attended by white children. The “separate but equal” doctrine has no application in the field of education and the segregation of children in public schools based solely on their race violates the Equal Protection Clause. Intangible as well as tangible factors must be considered when deciding if a statute discriminates. Therefore, separate is not equal.
Constitutional challenge to school segregation in the District of Columbia (D). The District of Columbia’s (D) school segregation policy was challenged by Bolling (P). Separate school facilities are so fundamentally unfair and discriminatory as to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. When discrimination is so unfair as to offend the American ideal of fairness and justice then it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Racial classifications are fundamentally suspect and must be scrutinized with the utmost care. These classifications will survive scrutiny if the classification is necessary to promote the most compelling governmental interest.
Decision to determine the manner in which relief from segregation in public schools is to be accorded. In May 1954, the Court decided that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional. It requested further arguments on the question of relief. The cases are remanded to the lower courts to enter orders consistent with equitable principles of flexibility and requiring the defendant to make a prompt and reasonable start toward full racial integration in public schools.
Appeal from refusal to order desegregation. Keys (P) filed suit seeking desegregation of all segregated schools in the School District (D), but the court ordered only the desegregation of the small segment directly affected by the conduct of the District (D). Where school authorities practice purposeful de jure segregation by race in a significant part of a school system, a de jure showing of segregation in each segment of the system is not required for a court order to desegregate the entire system. For purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause there is no difference between de facto and de jure segregation.
Appeal from reversal of order sustaining validity of employment qualification test. Washington (D) administered a written test of verbal skill, vocabulary, and reading comprehension to applicants for jobs on the Police Department, and since four times as many blacks failed the test than whites, Davis (P) brought suit alleging the invalidity of the test due to its discriminatory impact. The administration of a race-neutral test on relevant criteria to employment applicants does not violate the Equal Protection Clause where the test results in the elimination of a disproportionate number of racial minorities as opposed to white. Must be “because of” not merely “in spite of” -- A law or other official action is not unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact. There must be a racially discriminatory purpose behind the law if it is to be found invidiously discriminatory. Race is a suspect class and classifications based on race are therefore ordinarily subject to strict scrutiny. However, strict scrutiny will only be applied where the court finds that there was a governmental intent to discriminate against the disfavored group. The mere fact that a law has a less favorable effect on a racial minority that it has on the majority is not sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny.
Appeal from reversal of denial of rezoning application. The Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (P) sought to build townhouses for low income people in the village of Arlington Heights, Illinois (D). Official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact.
Action under state and federal Equal Protection Clauses regarding affirmative action. Bakke (P) challenged the constitutionality of the University of California at Davis’ (D) minority admissions policy to its medical school. The Equal Protection Clause’s guarantees are equally applicable to both minorities and the white majority, and preference of one group over another solely because of race is facially invalid. Affirmative Action (or reverse discrimination) based on race is subject to the same “strict” level of scrutiny as classical discrimination based on race. Take special notice of quotas -- virtually all racially-based quotas will be struck down even where the government is trying to eradicate the effects of past discrimination.
Action regarding minority set-asides by Congress. Adarand (P) was a white-owned construction firm and had bid for a sub-contract to supply guardrails to a federal highway project in Colorado. Plaintiff’s bid was the lowest. But the general contractor took a bid from a minority-owned firm that qualified under federal regulations as a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE). The prime contractor was not required to award the sub-contract to a minority-owned DBE, but it received a financial incentive for doing so. The Court in Adarand overruled Metro Broadcasting, and held that congressionally authorized race-conscious affirmative action programs must be subject to strict scrutiny.
Alienage, as used by the Court means, “not having U.S. Citizenship”
Review of refusal to hire aliens as elementary and secondary schoolteachers. The State of New York refused to employ aliens, though eligible for citizenship and otherwise qualified, as elementary and secondary public school teachers. Teaching in a public school constitutes a governmental function from which a state may bar aliens without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. Some state functions are so bound up with the operation of the state as a governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those functions of all persons who have not become part of the process of self-government. Though alienage is a “suspect-classification,” the standard of review is usually reduced when a governmental function is involved – when the employee is “employed by and acting as the agents of the state.”
Strict scrutiny is applied in alienage cases that involve (1) welfare benefits, (2) bar admissions, and (3) civil service jobs.
Constitutional challenge to a state educational restriction statute. A class action suit challenged a Texas law that prohibited the use of state funds to educate the children of undocumented aliens. Absent a showing that such a policy furthers a substantial state interest, a state may not deny a public education to the children of undocumented aliens. Undocumented aliens are not a “suspect class” and an education is not a fundamental right therefore this case would normally receive review under mere rationality. In this case, however, the Court was hesitant to punish the children for the sins of their parents so this case was scrutinized at a level closer to intermediate scrutiny.
Appeal from judgment striking down residency requirement. Only aliens who were residents of the United States for five years or more are who were admitted for permanent residency were eligible for a federal medical insurance program, and the district court found the residency requirement unconstitutional. Statutory discrimination within the class of aliens by the federal government is not unconstitutional if it is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest in proving medical benefits to those residing within its jurisdiction the longest and admitted for permanent residency. When the Federal government discriminates within the class of aliens it is acting under the constitutional power to control immigration and naturalization; the states may not act on this power granted solely to the federal government. All that is necessary for the statute to survive is a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.
Illegitimacy receives intermediate scrutiny
Appeal from judgment upholding New York paternity requirement. Though Lalli (P) was acknowledged repeatedly by Mario Lalli (D) as his illegitimate son, both orally and in documents, Lalli (P) was not permitted to inherit from Mario Lalli (D) as entitled by state intestate succession laws because he failed to produce a statutorily required court order of filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted during pregnancy or within two years of the birth of the child. An illegitimate child otherwise entitled under state intestate succession laws to inherit is not denied equal protection if he is not permitted to inherit for failure to provide a particular form of proof of paternity. Classifications based on illegitimacy must advance permissible governmental purposes and cannot be burdens placed on the illegitimate because of his status as such.
A statute that places a burden on a bastard that he himself may be able to surmount is likely to survive scrutiny.
Suit challenging the constitutionality of a statute. A statute provides that servicemen’s wives are automatically eligible for benefits as dependents while servicewomen must demonstrate that their husbands are dependent on them before they are eligible for the benefits. By according differential treatment to male and female members of the uniformed services for the sole purpose of achieving administrative convenience, the statutes violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by being discriminatorily unconstitutional. A statute that classifies based on gender must be substantially related to important governmental objectives (intermediate scrutiny).
Appeal from an action to have an Oklahoma statute declared unconstitutional. Craig (P) appealed after a federal district court upheld two sections of an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of “non-intoxicating” 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18 on the ground that such a gender based differential did not constitute a denial to males 18-20 years of age equal protection of the laws. Laws that establish classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives to be constitutionally in line with the Equal Protection Clause.
Appeal from judgment striking down veterans’ job preference. Massachusetts (D) enacted a statute granting veterans a preference in civil service employment consideration over non-veterans, and Feeney (P) filed this suit alleging a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause because the law operated to the advantage of males. A statute giving preference in civil service job consideration to a group comprised primarily of males does not violate the Equal Protection Clause without a showing of a purpose to discriminate on the basis of sex. Discriminatory intent is required to consider a statute unconstitutional, not mere awareness of a discriminatory consequence.
Appeal from decision that an admissions program violated Equal Protection Clause. The State (D) appealed from a decision finding that the admissions program of one of its nursing schools, which denied admission to males solely on the basis of their sex, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state can evoke a compensatory purpose to justify and otherwise gender based discriminatory classification only if members of the gender benefited by the classification actually suffer a disadvantage related to the classification. In order for gender based discriminations to pass scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state’s objective must first (1) be determined to be important and legitimate. Secondly (2) it must be determined whether the requisite direct, substantial relationship between the objective and the means is present. Gender based reverse discrimination (affirmative action) is subject to intermediate scrutiny.
Constitutional challenge to state welfare law. Williams (P) and other welfare recipients challenged the maximum payment portions of Maryland’s welfare programs. In fields of economic and social legislation not involving fundamental rights, a statute will survive and equal protection challenge if supported by legitimate state interests. When a fundamental right is not involved, the statute will be upheld if there is a legitimate state interest or concern – mere rationality.
Appeal from finding of unconstitutionality of dual public school financing system. Rodriguez (P), who resided in Edgewood district of the San Antonio Independent School District (SAISD) (D) where the highest school tax was paid and $356 per year per student was allocated, filed this suit alleging denial of equal protection since the Alamo Heights district of SAISD was taxed at a lower rate but produced enough revenue to permit the allocation of $594 per year per student there. The allocation of educational funds per year per pupil in a school district according to the amount produced by taxation in that district does not violate the equal protection rights of residents of other districts in the area paying a higher rate of tax which produces less revenue resulting in a lower per pupil allocation. Allocation of educational funds per year per pupil in a school district according to the amount produced by taxation in that district does not violate the equal protection rights of residents of other districts in the area. The court applied the mere rational test because education is not a fundamental right and property owners with a high tax rate are not a suspect class.
Fundamental Rights are (1) rights that are independently and explicitly guaranteed by some other constitutional provision (ex. speech, religion), and (2) rights that are felt to be important and implicitly granted by the constitution.
Constitutional challenge to state law. Illinois (D) denied a free stenographic transcript to indigents for their initial appeal of criminal convictions. Once appellate rights are offered, discrimination on the basis of wealth violates equal protection.
Appeal from criminal conviction. After his conviction, Douglas (D) was denied appointed counsel for assistance in pursuing his right of first appeal. The denial came after the appellate court had reviewed the transcript of his trial and, pursuant to state law, had determined that counsel would not be of help to the defendant. An indigent is entitled to appointed counsel to prepare an appellate brief where the appeal pursued is granted as a matter of right to all defendants
Appeal from a judgment finding a state’s apportionment plan and two proposed plans invalid. The current Alabama (D) apportionment plan was deemed invalid since it had not been reapportioned in nearly 60 years. The Equal Protection Clause requires apportionment by actual population for both houses of a state bicameral legislature. Suffrage is a fundamental right. Dilution of voting power impairs the right to suffrage because as much as a person’s right to vote is diluted, so is his citizenship.
Suites challenging the constitutionality of Virginia’s poll tax. Harper (P) and other Virginia residents brought this suit to have Virginia’s (D) poll tax declared unconstitutional. The right to vote is a fundamental and basic right and where such rights are asserted under the Equal protection clause, classifications that might restrain those rights must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined. Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored. The affluence of the voter is an unconstitutional electoral standard.
Appeal from invalidation of state voting procedures. Stone (P) claimed that Texas’ dual box election procedure denied him equal protection of the laws. In an election of general interest, restrictions on the franchise other than residence, age and citizenship must promote a compelling state interest in order to be valid.
Appeal in action to invalidate Illinois Election Code. The Socialist Workers Party (P) challenged the constitutionality of portions of the Illinois Election Code dealing with qualification of new political parties. Restrictions on access to the ballot must be justified by a compelling state interest. Restrictions on access to the ballot burden two fundamental rights: (1) the freedom to associate as a political party, and (2) the right to vote.
Appeal from decisions holding residency requirements for welfare applicants unconstitutional. Statutory provisions deny welfare assistance to residents who have not resided within their jurisdiction for at least one year. Any classification that serves to penalize the exercise of a constitutional right is unconstitutional unless it is shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, rather than merely be shown to rationally related to a legitimate purpose. The right to travel from state to state is protected by the Constitution from laws or regulations that would unreasonably burden such movement. If a law has no other purpose than to chill the assertion of a constitutional right by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, it is patently unconstitutional.
Any classification penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right is unconstitutional unless it is shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.
Appeal from decision upholding state statutory income distribution plan. The Zobel’s (P) challenged an Alaska scheme which distributed surplus income to its citizens depending on the length of residency. A state may not base the amount of surplus income to be distributed to its citizens on the length of time the citizens has resided in the state.
Review of order of restoration of passport. The President, through the Secretary of State, Haig (D), revoked the passport of Phillip Agee (P), an ex-CIA officer who had engaged in activities abroad regarded as damaging to the national security. The President and the Secretary of State my revoke a passport where the holder’s activities are causing or a likely to cause damage to national security. A passport is a “letter of introduction for the holder,” granted by the government, and is subject to reasonable governmental regulation.
Constitutional challenge to state law. Skinner (D) was deemed to be a habitual criminal and was ordered sterilized under a State (P) statute. A statute that arbitrarily excludes a class from its purview violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where fundamental rights are involved. The Right to have children is a fundamental right.
The Right to Privacy The penumbra right to privacy is created by the First Amendment’s right of association, the Third Amendment’s prohibition against the peacetime quartering of soldiers, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause, and the Ninth Amendment’s reservation to the people of unenumerated rights.
Appeal from conviction for violating state laws prohibiting the counseling of married persons to take contraceptives. Doctor (D) and layman (D) were prosecuted for advising married persons on the means of preventing contraception. The right to mental privacy, although not explicitly stated in the Bill of Rights, is a penumbra, formed by certain other explicit guarantees. As such, it is protected against state regulation that sweeps unnecessarily broad. While not constituting an independent source of rights, the Ninth Amendment suggests that the list of rights in the first eight amendments is not exhaustive.
Challenge to state laws making it a crime to procure an abortion except by medical advice to save the life of the mother. Roe (P), a single woman, wished to have her pregnancy terminated by an abortion. The right of privacy found in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The decision in Roe created a balancing test that compared the mother’s right to privacy with the fetuses right to life. As the fetus approaches viability, its rights become significant enough to be afforded state protection except where it is medically necessary to protect the mother.
Appeal from denial of injunction against enforcement of a state abortion statue. Planned Parenthood (P) sought declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of Pennsylvania’s statute regulating abortion, contending that its many restrictions were unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade. Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to terminate a pregnancy does the power of the state reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. A finding of an undue burden is shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.
Appeal from decision finding state sodomy statute unconstitutional. Bowers (D) and other state officials appealed from a court of appeals decision finding the Georgia sodomy statute unconstitutional in that it violated Hardwick’s (P) fundamental rights, since it applied to consensual homosexual sodomy. The Constitution does not grant a fundamental right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy. Fundamental liberties identified by this Court, and deserving of heightened judicial scrutiny, have either been liberties implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or liberties deeply rooted in this nation’s history and traditions.
A case in which the Court struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment that would have prevented the state or any of its cities from giving certain protections to gays or lesbians. The Colorado provision, known as “Amendment 2,” modified the Colorado constitution to provide that neither the state nor any subdivision shall “enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.
Appeal from reversal of order allowing cessation of death-delaying medical procedures. After Nancy Beth Cruzan (P) suffered severe injuries in an automobile accident that left her in a persistent vegetative state, her parents sought the withdrawal of her nutrition and hydration. A guardian may seek to withdraw the nutrition and hydration of an individual diagnosed in a persistent vegetative state if there is clear and convincing evidence of the individual’s previously expressed desire for such withdrawal.
A person in Cruzan’s condition has a fundamental right to refuse or direct the withdrawal of death delaying procedures.
Challenge to constitutionality of federal statute. As part of the Voting Rights Act, Congress inserted a provision that prohibited restrictions on the right to register to vote and the applicant’s inability to read and write English where the applicant had at least a sixth-grade education in an Puerto Rican school where instruction was primarily in Spanish. New York had a statutory requirement of an ability to read and write English as a prerequisite to voter registration. A federal statute enacted pursuant to the enabling clause of the Fourteenth Amendment supersedes any state constitutional or statutory provision that is in conflict with the federal law.
Action for injunctive and other relief to deal with refusal of property owners to sell to Negroes. Jones (P) brought suit in federal district court against the Alfred H. Mayer Co. (D) alleging that Mayer (D) refused to sell a home to him for the sole reason that Jones (P) is a Negro Congress, pursuant to the authority vested in it by the Thirteenth Amendment, which clothes “Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery, may validly bar all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property.
Action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 McCrary (P) and others were denied admission to certain private schools because of their race. The power given to Congress by the Thirteenth Amendment to legislate against the “badges and incidents” of slavery justifies the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibition against racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts; and, § 1981, in turn, prohibits “private, commercially operated nonsectarian schools from denying admission to prospective students because they are Negroes.
Constitutional challenge to Voting Rights act of 1965 South Carolia (P) and other states (P) challenged the validity of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Congress may, under the Fifteenth Amendment, prescribe appropriate voter registration and election procedures.
A case making it clear that a bizarre shape is not a requirement for a racial gerrymander claim and all that the plaintiff must prove is that race was a predominant factor in the drawing of the district lines. Because Georgia had previously been found to discriminate against African Americans in voting, it was subject to the “pre-clearance” provisions of the federal Voting Rights Act. Under these provisions, any redistricting plan had to be pre-approved by the Justice Department. The Justice Department took the position that any redistricting plan must create at least three majority black districts. After initially resisting, the Georgia legislature eventually came up with a plan that included three such districts, including the district at issue. In the litigation, the state essentially conceded that the drawing of the lines for the district was done mostly for racial reasons, because of the need to produce three majority black districts to satisfy the Justice Department. The fact that the district was relatively compact, and no more irregular or bizarre in its shape that many districts was not enough to save it, given the race conscious motives with which it was drawn.
Appeal from conviction for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act, conspiracy to use the mails for transmission of non-mailable material, and unlawful use of the mails. During a time of war, Schenck (D) mailed circulars to draftees which were calculated to cause insubordination in the armed services and to obstruct the U.S. recruiting and enlistment program in violation of military laws. The test to determine the constitutionality of a statute restricting free speech is whether, under the circumstances, the speech is of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that it will bring about the substantive evils which Congress has a right to prevent. The question in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a person’s falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.
Appeal from a criminal conspiracy conviction. Abrams (D) and others passed out leaflets condemning U.S. efforts “to crush” the Russian revolution. Only speech that is intended to produce a “clear and present danger” may be punished.
Appeal from conviction for criminal anarchy. Gitlow (D) published a radical manifesto encouraging workers to strike and to use militant means to overthrow the government and was convicted therefore under a “criminal anarchy statute” enacted in New York (P). A state may prohibit speech likely to cause a danger of substantive evil. The legislature may determine, by statute, that a particular type of speech is likely to cause a danger of substantive evil. As long as the statute is constitutional, it will be upheld.
Appeal from conviction for violation of criminal syndicalism act. Miss Whitney (D), organizer and member of the Communist Labor Party of California, was convicted of aiding in the organization’s violation of the Criminal Syndicalism Act. In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated. No danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present unless the threatened evil is so imminent that it may strike before opportunity for discussion on it – must be an imminent clear and present danger.
Appeal from conviction for violation of the Ohio criminal syndicalism statute. Brandenburg (D) was convicted under a state statute which proscribes advocacy of the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing reform. The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of press do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to produce or incite such action. The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
Appeal from conviction for disorderly conduct. Hell (D) was convicted of disorderly conduct after uttering an exhortation to “take” a street that police were clearing during a demonstration. Hess (D) said, “We’ll take the fucking street later [or again].” The Court found this to be protected speech, rather than an unprotected incitement to illegal action. Construed least favorably to the defendant, the statement was “nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at “some indefinite future time.” Only words intended to produce and likely to produce imminent disorder can be punished.
Action by federal government to restrain newspaper publication. Government (P) sought to enjoin, in the interest of “national security,” the Times (D) and the Post (D) from further publishing of portions of the “Pentagon Papers,” a classified, “top secret” study. Any system of prior restraints on the freedom of press bears a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.
Appeal from denial of constructive trust in breach of contract case. Snepp (D) published a book based on his experience as a CIA agent, despite his promise not to divulge classified information or to publish only information without prepublication clearance. If a government agent publishes unreviewed material in violation of his contractual and fiduciary obligation, a constructive trust will be imposed, requiring him to disgorge the benefits of his breach of duty.
Appeal from criminal contempt conviction. Eight black ministers (D) ignored a court order enjoining them from parading or congregating without a permit. One who disobeys and injunction, without first seeking orderly judicial review of the order, will be found in contempt of court. Thought one is free to violate an unconstitutionally vague statute restricting free speech, one cannot freely violate the same words when written up as a court injunction.
Appeal from conviction of violating a statutory prohibition against marching in a parade without a permit. A Birmingham ordinance made it a misdemeanor to participate in a parade demonstration, or procession without a permit. In determining whether a “narrowing construction” of a statute will allow a conviction to “pass constitutional muster,” it is relevant to determine whether the statute was applied within the ambits of the limiting construction. Although a parade is not pure speech, it is a manner of expressing speech/ideas and is protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Officials, therefore, cannot be given unfettered freedom to grant or deny permits for this type of protected activity. They may only regulate time, place and manner.
Appeal from the invalidation of a state statute. Munson (P) contended that a Maryland (D) statute which prohibited the solicitation of charitable contributions by an organization which did not use 75% of its receipts for charitable purposes violated freedom of speech. A percentage limitation on funds expended in solicitation for charitable purposes is a violation of freedom of speech.
Appeal from a constitutional challenge to a preferential access system. The collective bargaining agreement which the Board of Education signed with PEA (D), the duly elected bargaining representative of the teachers in the school district provided that no other union, such as PLEA (P), would have access to the inter-school mail system and the teacher mail boxes. Implicit in the concept of a nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity that are reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves. A state may reserve a nonpublic forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, so long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because the state opposes the speaker’s view.
Appeal from partial reversal of award of injunction against charitable solicitation. Krishna (P) sought declaratory and injunctive relief after the Port Authority (D) adopted a regulation forbidding repetitive solicitation of money or distribution of literature within three airport terminals. An airport terminal operated by a public authority is not a public forum, and thus, a regulation prohibiting solicitation in the interior of an airport terminal does not violate the First Amendment. A traditional public forum is property that has as a principal purpose the free exchange of ideas.
Review of denial of challenge to federal regulation. Certain federal regulations prohibited clinics receiving federal funding from providing abortion counseling or referrals. The government may constitutionally prohibit clinics receiving federal funding from providing abortion counseling or referrals. The government may use sticks and carrots to control speech.
An injunction that serves as a restriction on “time, place and manner,” will be subjected to slightly more stringent review than would a generally applicable statute containing the same substance. Madsen (P) involved anti-abortion activists who waged an intense campaign of protests around a particular Florida abortion clinic. A local judge granted an initial injunction prohibiting the protesters from blocking or interfering with public access to the clinic and from physically abusing people entering or leaving it. After this injunction did not seem to work, the judge issued a broader injunction. It was this second injunction that came before the Supreme Court. An injunction is subject to a more stringent appellate review than a generally applicable statute or regulation because an injunction carries a greater risk of censorship and discriminatory application than do general ordinances.
Criminal prosecution for violation of disturbing the peace statute. Cohen (D) wore a jacket with the words “Fuck the Draft” on it in a courthouse corridor and was arrested and convicted under a disturbing the peach statute. A state cannot bar the use of offensive words either because such words are inherently likely to cause a violent reaction or because the state wishes to eliminate such words to protect the public morality. Cohen’s (D) speech does not come within any of the exceptions to the general rule that the form and content of speech cannot be regulated: (1) this is not a prohibition designed to protect courthouse decorum because the statute is not so limited; (2) this is not an obscenity case because the words were not erotic; (3) this is not a case of fighting words which are punishable as inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction because here the words were not directed as a personal insult to any person; and (4) this is not a captive audience problem since a viewer could merely avert his eyes.
Appeal from reversal of dismissal of “hate crime” prosecution. When R.A.V. (D) was charged with allegedly burning a cross inside the fenced yard of a black family, the City of St. Paul (P) charged R.A.V. (D) under the Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance. Where content discrimination in an ordinance is not reasonably necessary to achieve a city’s compelling interests, the ordinance cannot survive First Amendment scrutiny. Obscenity, defamation, and fighting words can be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribeable content but these categories cannot be regulated in a content-based manner.
Statutes considered “penalty enhancements” for hate-crimes are valid. Mitchel (D), a black teenager, was convicted of aggravated battery, a crime that ordinarily caries a maximum sentence of two years in prison. However, there was strong evidence that Mitchel (D) had selected his victim based on race. Under Wisconsin (P) law, the maximum sentence was increased to seven years because of Mitchel’s (D) race-based selection of a victim. A statute aimed at conduct not speech is valid.
“Right of reply” statute. The Miami Herald Publishing Co. (D) appealed from a decision validating a statute that required newspapers to give political candidates equal space to reply to criticisms and attacks in the press. Newspapers cannot be compelled by statute to publish “replies” to editorial opinions with which certain persons (including the subject of the editorial) may disagree. The statute would have resulted in self-censorship by the press in an effort to avoid printing political replies. This would constructively affect the newspaper’s freedom of speech.
Appeal from judgment holding a ban on television editorializing unconstitutional. The League of Women Voters (League) (P) contended that the Public Broadcasting Amendments Act of 1981, which prohibited public broadcasting stations from editorializing, was a violation of the First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Restrictions on broadcasters are constitutionally valid only if they are narrowly tailored to further a substantial interest. The Court recognized and reiterated the fact that restrictions on broadcasters differ from those on other forms of media because of the finite number of channels available for use.
Appeal from contempt citations for failure to testify before state and federal grand juries. Newsmen refused to testify before state and federal grand juries, claiming that their news sources were confidential. The First Amendment’s freedom of press does not exempt a reporter from disclosing to a grand jury information that he has received in confidence. Newsmen cannot invoke a testimonial privilege not enjoyed by other citizens.
Appeal from affirmation of grant of declaratory relief. Stanford (P) published pictures of an altercation between police and students, and the police, pursuant to a warrant, entered and searched Stanford’s (P) offices for any photographs of the event, after which Stanford (P) filed this civil action. A search of a newspaper’s premises for evidence of a crime pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate does not violate the newspaper’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The Privacy Protection Act of 1980 limits search and seizure of materials intended for dissemination unless necessary to prevent crime and/or protect the national security.
Appeal from order of prior restraint of publication. After the district court ordered Nebraska (P) to refrain from publishing or broadcasting accounts of any confessions or admissions made by a criminal defendant accused of six murders, Nebraska (P) filed suit seeking to avoid the order as an unconstitutional prior restrain on the freedom of speech. A prior restraint of pretrial publication of accounts of a crime violates the First Amendment protection of free speech when used as a means of attempting to protect the criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial. There is no priority assigned to one constitutional amendment as opposed to another; that is to say the right of an accused is not subordinate to the right to publish in all circumstances. The trial court, therefore, sho | |||||||||